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MEANS AND ENDs IN CITY OF ARLINGTON V
FCC: IGNORING THE LAWYER'S CRAFT TO
RESHAPE THE SCOPE OF CHEVRON DEFERENCE
Michael P. Healy*
ABSTRACT
In last year's term, the United States Supreme Court considered the question
of the scope of Chevron deference in City of Arlington v. FCC. This article
discusses how the decision is an example of the work of an activist Court. The case
should have been resolved by a straightforward determination under the analysis
of United States v. Mead that Chevron deference simply did not apply to the
Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC') legal determination. The Court
ignored this restrained approach to the case and instead addressed the question
the Justices desired to decide: the reach of Chevron deference. The article
discusses and criticizes the approach of Justice Scalia writing for the majority and
of Chief Justice Roberts writing for three dissenting Justices.
Practitioners and scholars of administrative law can only be confused by the
Court's willingness to apply Chevron in City of Arlington, given the informal
administrative action being reviewed and the fact that neither reviewing court
actually applied each of the two parts of the Mead test. The Court's flawed
administrative law analysis results from the activist concerns of Justice Scalia and
Chief Justice Roberts. Justice Scalia uses the case as a vehicle to undermine Mead,
a decision that Justice Scalia loathes. Chief Justice Roberts uses the case as a
vehicle to advocate for less judicial deference and less law defining power for
increasingly powerful agencies. Neither member of the Court allowed the
applicable rules of contemporary administrative law to hinder his efforts to achieve
his broader goals. Administrative law would have been better served if a properly
* Wendell H. Ford Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. J.D., 1984, University of
Pennsylvania; B.A., 1978, Williams College. The author thanks Judge John Rogers and Kent Barnett for
reviewing an earlier draft of this article. The author is responsible for any errors.
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restrained Court had considered and applied the previously determined rules for
judicial review of administrative agencies.
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INTRODUCTION
Chief Justice Roberts at his confirmation hearings notably claimed that the
judiciary should properly play only a minimalist, restrained role in our modern
democracy.1 In contrast with this view of the modest role the judiciary ought to
play, Chief Justice Roberts and his conservative colleagues have stated grave
concerns about the "vast power" that administrative agencies "wield" over
regulated parties.2 Central to reducing these concerns is a strong role of review to
' See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & David E. Rosenbaum, Court Nominee Prizes "Modesty, " He Tells the
Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005, at Al ("In his first written response to questions from the lawmakers
who will review his nomination to the Supreme Court, Judge John G. Roberts Jr. told the Senate
Judiciary Committee on Tuesday that judges must possess 'a degree of modesty and humility,' must be
respectful of legal precedent and must be willing to change their minds .... 'Judges must be constantly
aware that their role, while important, is limited,' Judge Roberts wrote. 'They do not have a commission
to solve society's problems, as they see them, but simply to decide cases before them according to the
rule of law."'); Bruce Weber, Umpires v. Judges, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2009, at I ("'Judges are like
umpires,' Judge Roberts declared in the opening remarks to his own confirmation hearings. 'Umpires
don't make the rules; they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure
everybody plays by the rules. But it is a limited role.' . . . [S]ince the Roberts hearings, the umpire
metaphor has become synonymous, at least in public debate, with judicial restraint, the idea that judges
are merely arbiters, that their job is not to set aside precedent and create law but to decide cases on the
basis of established law."); see also Adam Liptak, In His Opinions, Nominee Favors Judicial Caution,
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2005, at Al ("[H]is insistence, in the two years he has sat on the federal appeals
court in Washington, that judges must engage in considerable self-restraint could add a distinctive voice
to a court that has not been shy in recent years in asserting its own dominance. In a decision last year,
Judge Roberts referred to 'the cardinal principle of judicial restraint-if it is not necessary to decide
more, it is necessary not to decide more."'); Jeffrey Rosen, Op-Ed., The Trial of John Roberts, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2009, at 18 ("[Chief Justice Roberts] said he would try to persuade his colleagues to
converge around narrow, unanimous opinions that avoided the most contentious constitutional issues.
The result, he said, would help shore up the [C]ourt's legitimacy in a polarized age."); Sheryl Gay
Stolberg & David D. Kirkpatrick, Next Debate: Must Future Court Nominees Match Qualifications of
Roberts?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2005, at 30 ("Wendy Long, counsel of the Judicial Confirmation
Network and a former clerk for Justice Thomas, said no other nominee 'has ever given as crisp and
convincing and strong a statement of the essence of originalism and judicial restraint' as Judge Roberts
did, when he told the committee that, unlike politicians, judges should be faithful to a law's text and
history without regard to their personal views, campaign promises or social results.").
2 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("The
administrative state 'wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily life."') (quoting Free
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010)); see also Rapanos v.
United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) ("The burden of federal regulation
on those who would deposit fill materials in locations denominated 'waters of the United States' is not
trivial. In deciding whether to grant or deny a permit, the [United States] Army Corps of Engineers []
exercises the discretion of an enlightened despot ... ").
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be played by the federal courts.' The Roberts Court has found it difficult to balance
judicial restraint with a perceived need to constrain administrative power when the
Court decides administrative restraint is needed.
One would expect that a restrained Court would, at a minimum, resolve
preliminary, technical issues before finding it necessary to confront other, more
controversial issues. Recent decisions by the Roberts Court, however, suggest that
the Court may actively seek to redefine administrative law without the constraints
that the more mundane norms of decision making and legal doctrines impose on the
development of law. Notwithstanding the protestations of the Chief Justice, his
Court has decided to resolve issues at the heart of modem administrative law, even
though more modest, more restrained options were available. Such decisions cast
doubt on the Chief Justice's claim of judicial restraint.4
The most obvious example of an activist Court reaching out to redefine
administrative law is Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Accounting Oversight Board.5
There, the Chief Justice wrote the opinion for the conservative majority and struck
down as unconstitutional a limitation on the President's removal power. The Court
established a broad new constitutional rule limiting the independence of agencies
6
' City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1886 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("Our duty to police the boundary
between the Legislature and the Executive is as critical as our duty to respect that between the Judiciary
and the Executive. In the present context, that means ensuring that the Legislative Branch has in fact
delegated law making power to an agency within the Executive Branch, before the Judiciary defers to
the Executive on what the law is. That concern is heightened, not diminished, by the fact that the
administrative agencies, as a practical matter, draw upon a potent brew of executive, legislative, and
judicial power. And it is heightened, not diminished, by the dramatic shift in power over the last [fifty]
years from Congress to the Executive-a shift effected through the administrative agencies.") (citation
omitted)); cf Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012) ("The Government warns that the
[Environmental Protection Agency ('EPA')] is less likely to use the orders if they are subject to judicial
review. That may be true-but it will be true for all agency actions subjected to judicial review. The
[Administrative Procedure Act's] presumption of judicial review is a repudiation of the principle that
efficiency of regulation conquers all. And there is no reason to think that the Clean Water Act was
uniquely designed to enable the strong-arming of regulated parties into 'voluntary compliance' without
the opportunity for judicial review-even judicial review of the question whether the regulated party is
within the EPA's jurisdiction.") (citation omitted).
4 A reporter recently concluded that he Chief Justice has led a more restrained Court. See Adam Liptak,
Op-Ed., How Activist Is the Supreme Court?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2013, at SR4, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/13/sunday-review/how-activist-is-the-supreme-court.html?page
wanted=all&_r=0 ("If judicial activism is defined as the tendency to strike down laws, the court led by
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. is less activist than any court in the last [sixty] years.").
' 561 U.S. 477.
6 Id. at 501-02.
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without first deciding a critical statutory question,7 thereby breaking a long-
accepted prudential limit on the Court's constitutional law making authority.
8
In last year's term, the Court considered the scope of Chevron deference in
City ofArlington v. FCC.9 Justice Scalia wrote the Court's opinion, while the Chief
Justice dissented. Both Justices decided to resolve a foundational question
regarding the scope of Chevron deference without first considering the threshold
question defined by the Court's decision in Mead whether Chevron deference
properly applied. As to that question, the Court should have come to the straight-
forward conclusion that Chevron simply did not apply to the review of the FCC's
decision."°
This article will discuss how this recent decision illustrates that the Roberts
Court is neither restrained nor minimalist in its efforts to shape administrative law.
I. THE DECISION BEING REVIEWED
A proper understanding of the Court's activism necessitates a review of the
Fifth Circuit's decision in City of Arlington v. FCC." That court's application of
administrative law was surprising and worthy of reversal. That the court's decision
was reviewed and affirmed by the Supreme Court indicates that the Court had a
different objective.12
The FCC plays the critical regulatory role over cellular phone operations.'
3
Those operations are dependent on the use of local antennas attached to towers.
14
Local government has some regulatory authority over these towers because of
The Court decided the case based on the parties' agreement that members of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "SEC") may be removed by the President only for cause. Id. at 486-87. In
his dissent, Justice Breyer chided the Court for deciding an important constitutional question based on
an assumption made by the parties. Id. at 545-48 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He argued that the statutory
issue was "certainly not obvious." Id.
8 A contrary interpretation of the statute, that SEC Commissioners held their positions at the will of the
President, was supported by the well-accepted constitutional question avoidance canon. Id.
9 City ofArlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013).
'0 See infra notes 54-73 and accompanying text.
City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2012), aftd, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
12 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1875.
"3 Id. at 1866-7.
14 id.
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zoning and land use law. 5 When Congress amended the Federal Communications
Act in 1996, Congress added a requirement that state or local government agencies
"act on any request for authorization to place, construct, or modify personal
wireless service facilities within a reasonable period of time after the request is
duly filed."'
16
In 2008, an association of wireless communications providers petitioned the
FCC for a "declaratory ruling" that would impose presumptive limits on the time
within which state or local agencies would have to decide on cell phone tower
requests filed by providers.7 The FCC published a notice of the petition and
"received dozens of comments from wireless service providers, local zoning
authorities, and other interested parties."'" The FCC thereafter issued its
Declaratory Ruling, establishing presumptive limits for the "reasonable period of
time" permitted by the statute.19 That ruling was then challenged in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The parties challenging the ruling argued first that the FCC had promulgated a
regulation without complying with the Administrative Procedure Act's (the
"APA") requirements for informal rulemaking.° The FCC had two responses to
this challenge: The agency asserted that its action on the petition was an
adjudication rather than a rulemaking, and, alternatively, that if the agency had
issued rules, those rules were interpretive.2' The agency notably did not claim that
it had promulgated a legislative rule. The FCC contended that under either of
15 Id.
16 Id. at 1866 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) (2012)).
7 The petition was quite detailed in specifying the requirements that the providers believed to be
appropriate. Id. at 234-35.
I'8 d. at 235.
'9 The Declaratory Ruling provided that the statutory 'reasonable period of time' ... presumptively
would be 90 days for personal wireless service facility siting applications requesting collocations and
150 days for all other applications." Id. (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted). The Ruling also provided
that "although the 90- and 150-day time frames established by the Declaratory Ruling were
presumptively reasonable, state or local authorities would have the opportunity in any given case to
rebut that presumption in court." Id. at 236 (footnote omitted).
2 0
See5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
21 City ofArlington, 668 F.3d at 240.
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theory, the agency was not required to comply with informal rulemaking
requirements.
22
The Fifth Circuit initially concluded, in agreement with the agency's
characterization of its action, that the FCC had engaged in an informal adjudication
when it issued its Declaratory Ruling.23 The Court then turned its attention to the
question whether the agency had been arbitrary or capricious in deciding to proceed
by adjudication, rather than rulemaking.24 On this question, the court "harbor[ed]
serious doubts.,25 The court had such "doubts" because the results of the agency's
action-presumptively unreasonable time limits for action by a local agency-
"bear all the hallmarks of products of rulemaking, not adjudication,,26 and did,
indeed, constitute "classic rulemaking."
27
The agency, of course, had not complied with the APA § 553 requirements
for notice and comment rulemaking, a failure that the city claimed was unlawful.
28
The agency provided its response to this claimed illegality: The APA did not
require compliance with § 553 because the rulemaking had been interpretive and
thus exempt from the procedural requirements.29 Such an argument ought o have
appealed to the court because it had earlier used language suggesting exactly that
conclusion when it characterized the FCC's action as "ha[ving] provided guidance
on the meaning of § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) and (v) that is utterly divorced from any
22 Id.
23 Id. at 241. The court's decision in this regard relied on circuit precedent that a declaratory ruling by
the FCC is an adjudication. Id. at 241 n.45.
24 Id. at 241.
25 Id. at 242.
26 Id. at 242-43 ("[T]he FCC established the 90- and 150-day time frames, not in the course of deciding
any specific dispute between a wireless provider and a state or local government, but in a proceeding
focused exclusively on providing an interpretation of § 332(c)(7)(B) that would apply prospectively to
every state and local government in the United States."). The court's conclusion that the ruling was not
an adjudication was reinforced by the court's rejection of the petitioners' argument that the agency
violated Due Process by failing to provide notice to localities whose practices were challenged by the
petition for a ruling. Id. at 246. The court held that such individual notice was not required because the
agency "was not adjudicating the legality of the actions of those state and local governments." Id.
27 Id. at 243 ("This is classic rulemaking.").
2' Id. at 240.
29 Id. at 243 ("We also do not address the FCC's argument that, even if it did engage in rulemaking, the
rulemaking was interpretative rulemaking of the type excepted from the APA's notice-and-comment
requirements.").
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) * DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2015.332
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu
MEANS AND ENDS IN CIrY OF ARLINGTON V. FCC
PAGE I 399
specific application of the statute."3° "[P]rovid[ing] guidance on the meaning of"
statutory provisions, rather than making law pursuant to a delegation of law making
power, is precisely what an agency does in an interpretive rule.
31
Having rejected this coherent response to the claimed procedural violation,
the court concluded instead that the FCC's failure to comply with § 553 was
harmless error.32 The court concluded that the petitioners had received adequate
notice and opportunity for comment and that the agency had considered all of the
substantive issues that the petitioners were advocating before the Court of
Appeals.
33
The court then turned its attention to the challenges to the FCC's substantive
determination of time frames for local agencies' decisions on petitions. The first
such challenge, later reviewed by the Supreme Court, was that "the FCC lacked the
statutory authority to adopt the 90- and 150-day time frames."34 The FCC replied to
this contention by relying on its general rulemaking authority.35 In summarizing the
argument, the court did not reflect on the irony of the agency's argument: The FCC
had not purported to exercise that power when it issued the Declaratory Ruling.36
The court then proceeded to its analysis, which began immediately with
application of Chevron: "We ordinarily review an agency's interpretation of the
statutes it is charged with administering using the Chevron two-step standard of
review."37 The court never cited United States v. Mead Corp.38 There is, thus, no
30 
Id.
"' Id.; see also Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 94-95 (1995).
32 City ofArlington, 668 F.3d at 243.
33 Id. at 245-46. The court's harmless error analysis suggested an exceptionally minimal view of the
APA's § 553 requirements. There was, for example, no discussion of the logical outgrowth requirement.
See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 174-75 (2007) (holding that the
logical outgrowth test, which has the "object" of "fair notice," had been met).
14 City ofArlington, 668 F.3d at 247.
11 Id. at 247 ("The FCC, on the other hand, contends that it possessed statutory authority to adopt the 90-
and 150-day time frames pursuant to its general authority to make such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the Communication Act's provisions.").
36 The FCC, it may be recalled, had argued that the declaratory ruling was an adjudication or an
interpretive rule. Supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
17 City ofArlington, 668 F.3d at 247 (footnote omitted).
38 See generally id.; United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) * DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2015.332
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
PAGE 1 400 I VOL. 76 I 2015
discussion, not even so much as a mention, that Mead had imposed threshold
requirements before an agency interpretation of law would be accorded Chevron
deference.39 Instead, the court turned to the disputed question "whether Chevron
review should apply when we determine the extent of the agency's jurisdiction."
40
Although the court opined that "[t]he Supreme Court has not yet conclusively
resolved the question of whether Chevron applies in the context of an agency's
determination of its own statutory jurisdiction,"'" the court stated that the Fifth
Circuit had decided the question and that Chevron deference did apply.
42
The court accordingly proceeded with its Chevron analysis, construing the
step one clear statute analysis as a proper component of Chevron review.43 The
court stated:
The question we confront under Chevron is whether these provisions
unambiguously indicate Congress's intent to preclude the FCC from
implementing § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) and (v). If they do, the FCC lacked statutory
authority to issue the 90- and 150-day time frames. If the provisions are
ambiguous, however, we must defer to the FCC's interpretation-an
interpretation under which the FCC possessed authority to issue the 90- and 150-
day time frames-so long as the FCC's interpretation represents a reasonable
construction of their terms.44
The court then concluded that the Communications Act "is silent on the
question of whether the FCC can use its general authority under the
" See City ofArlington, 668 F.3d 229; Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27. The failure of the Court of Appeals to
consider Mead's requirements for the application of Chevron deference is not uncommon. See Lisa
Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review ofAgency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443,
1464-65 (2005) ("In many cases, the courts express their uncertainty about Mead by refraining from
deciding clearly whether Chevron deference applies. Instead, they find an easier way out. Some refuse
to choose between Chevron deference and Skidmore deference and simply determine that lower-level
Skidmore deference supports the agency's interpretation. Others refuse to choose and simply determine
that both Chevron deference and Skidmore deference support the agency's interpretation.") (footnote
omitted).
40 City ofArlington, 668 F.3d at 248.
41 Id.
42 id.
41 Id. at 248-49.
44Id. at 250.
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Communications Act to implement § 332(c)(7)(B)'s limitations. We proceed to
Chevron step two. ' 45 The court's step-two analysis was innovative, but
unilluminating. The court did not engage in arbitrary or capricious review.46 Rather
the court, inter alia, reviewed the statute's legislative history to determine whether
there was clear legislative intent on the question of the scope of the FCC's
authority to define law.47 This is a novel, but surely incorrect, view of the Chevron
step-two inquiry.48 At the end of its analysis, the court held that "the FCC is
entitled to deference with respect to its exercise of authority to implement
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) and (v)."4 9
The court then proceeded to its consideration of whether the time limits
identified by the FCC were permissible. The court again made no mention of the
Mead analysis in determining the applicable review standard: Chevron or
Skidmore. The court again proceeded immediately to an application of Chevron
review. The court concluded that the statute is "inherently ambiguous" on the
question of the meaning of "a reasonable period of time."50 The court then
concluded that the FCC's interpretation was reasonable.5
II. THE MINIMALIST, RESTRAINED APPROACH TO REVIEW
Having summarized the Fifth Circuit's deeply flawed decision, this article
considers briefly, what a minimalist and properly restrained review of the decision
would have involved. For purposes of this discussion, this article omits an
evaluation of the Fifth Circuit's provocative harmless error analysis, by which the
court concluded that the agency's failure to conform to required notice and
45 Id. at 252.
46 Compare id. at 252-54, with Michael P. Healy, Reconciling Chevron, Mead, and the Review of
Agency Discretion: Source of Law and the Standards of Judicial Review, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1,
42-45 (2011) (discussing how courts should apply arbitrary or capricious review at the second step
of Chevron).
47 City of Arlington, 668 F.3d at 252-53.
41 If consideration of legislative intent and legislative history is proper when interpreting a statute, such
consideration is part of traditional statutory construction. A court relies on those traditional methods to
determine whether a statute is clear at step one of Chevron. See Healy, supra note 46, at 33-39
(discussing step one of Chevron).
'9 City ofArlington, 668 F.3d at 254.
50 Id. at 255 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
" Id. at 255-60. The court also concluded that the FCC was not arbitrary or capricious in defining the
time frames for state and local decision-making. Id. at 260-61.
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) * DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2015.332
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
PAGE 1 402 I VOL. 76 I 2015
comment rulemaking procedures was harmless error.5 2 The critical issue in the case
concerned, of course, whether Chevron deference applied to an agency's
determination regarding the scope of its own jurisdiction. This question is relevant
only if the case is one in which Chevron deference otherwise applies. If Chevron
deference is simply inapplicable, the question would never arise.
In United States v. Mead, the Supreme Court decided that Chevron did not
apply in every case in which an agency has interpreted a statute.53 Rather, the Court
decided, based on its view of inferred congressional intent, that Congress intended
that a court defer to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute only when
two conditions are met: 1) Congress must have delegated lawmaking power to the
agency and 2) the agency must have interpreted the statute in the exercise of that
delegated law making power-the agency itself must have acted to make law.54 As
mentioned above, the Fifth Circuit did not engage in the Mead analysis; the Fifth
Circuit neither cited nor discussed Mead.5' The court instead proceeded
immediately to apply Chevron, which the court viewed as including both of the
famous steps described in that case. The only issue that the court addressed
regarding the applicability of Chevron was whether it applied to an agency's
determination of its own jurisdiction, an issue the court found had been resolved by
circuit precedent.56
Had the Fifth Circuit applied the rule of law defined by Mead, and
reconfirmed by, inter alia, Oregon v. Gonzales57 and National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services,58 it would have considered
whether the two requirements for the application of Chevron deference had been
met. The first of those requirements is that Congress must have delegated to the
agency the power to engage in the making of law.59 Indeed, those challenging the
declaratory ruling claimed that Congress had not delegated to the FCC the power to
define by regulations the reasonable time within which local agencies had to decide
52 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
13 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
54 Id.
" See City ofArlington, 668 F.3d at 247-48.
56 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
17 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
58 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
19 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
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on applications for the use of cell phone antennas.60 Moreover, in its Petitioner's
Brief to the Supreme Court, the Petitioner specifically argued that "[t]he error
committed by the Fifth Circuit Panel is that it mechanically applied Chevron
deference without first, de novo, performing a Chevron Step 0 analysis."
61
The first Mead requirement is necessarily a question of the scope of the
agency's delegated lawmaking authority. In Oregon v. Gonzales,62 the Supreme
Court engaged in an elaborate analysis of the lawmaking authority that Congress
had delegated to the Department of Justice (the "DOJ") under the Controlled
Substances Act (the "CSA") to determine whether Congress had delegated to the
DOJ the power to define as unlawful the prescribing of drugs to allow euthanasia in
Oregon, a state that had permitted such practices. The Court's analysis, which
considered the scope of authority delegated to the agency under two different
provisions and involved the application of canons and presumptions of meaning,
involved the Court discerning Congress' intended delegation to the DOJ and
plainly did not involve any deference to the agency.63 The Court concluded that
there had been no delegation of lawmaking power to the DOJ regarding the
particular decision it had made, although the DOJ had received delegated
lawmaking power to address other regulatory matters.
64
Of course, it would not have made sense for the Court to have accorded
deference to an agency on the question whether Congress had delegated lawmaking
power to the agency. Such an application of the Mead analysis conflicts with the
separate role defined for courts and agencies in determining the content of public
law. The court alone has the power to interpret a statute in order to determine the
60 City ofArlington, 668 F.3d at 247.
6 Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 17, City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (No. II-
1547); see also id. at 38 ("Chevron Step 0 mandates that deference not be applied in this particular
circumstance."). The Petitioner used the label "Chevron Step 0" to refer to the Mead analysis. See id. at
17 ("Th[e] [Mead] approach, which is called Chevron Step 0, is grounded in the uncontroversial idea
that deference to agency interpretation of statutes it administers is appropriate only where Congress has
delegated that authority."); see also id. at 46-54.
62 546 U.S. 243.
63 See id. at 258-69. Notably, the Court relied on the elephants-in-mouseholes canon in concluding that
"[t]he idea that Congress gave the Attorney General such broad and unusual authority through an
implicit delegation in the CSA's registration provision is not sustainable." Id. at 267.
4 Id. at 259 ("The CSA gives the Attorney General limited powers, to be exercised in specific ways.").
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content of the law enacted by Congress, including the nature of the authority that
Congress has delegated to an agency.
65
Moreover, according deference to the agency on the question whether
Congress delegated lawmaking power simply conflicts directly with the basic
theory of Mead. Mead's purpose and effect are lost if a court is to accord proper
Chevron deference to the agency when the court is deciding whether to accord
Chevron deference. Mead held that such deference is not to be accorded to an
agency's legal interpretation until after the court itself has decided whether
Congress intended such deference based on the congressional delegation of
lawmaking power and the agency's exercise of that power.66 Such congressional
intent may be determined by a court based on a presumption of the sort that Justice
Scalia identified in his decision: the presumption that a broad grant of rulemaking
power is a grant of such authority as to any application of the statute.67 This is a
presumption that may properly answer the first of the two Mead questions that
determine whether Chevron deference applies. This would not, however, in any
sense itself be an application of Chevron deference, which Mead holds is not
applicable until each of the two threshold questions is answered in the
affirmative.
68
65 See Healy, supra note 46, at 21 ("Mead reinforced the principle that Congress determines the degree
of deference courts owe to agency legal interpretations. This principle applies even though the judiciary
is the institution that necessarily decides what Congress had intended as the proper amount of
deference.") (footnote omitted).
66 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237 (2001).
67 City ofArlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874 ("What the dissent needs, and fails to produce, is a single case in
which a general conferral of rulemaking or adjudicative authority has been held insufficient to support
Chevron deference for an exercise of that authority within the agency's substantive field. There is no
such case, and what the dissent proposes is a massive revision of our Chevron jurisprudence."). The
FCC argued that Congress had delegated broad lawmaking power to the agency. Brief for Federal
Respondents at 10-14, City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (No. 11-1545). The FCC
argued that given the broad congressional delegation, the conclusion that Congress delegated lawmaking
power to the FCC regarding the antenna provision was correct regardless of whether the determination
was reviewed de novo. Id. at 13-14.
61 Mead, 533 U.S. at 227-34. Professor Strauss has contended that Skidmore deference should apply in
resolving the initial Mead inquiry. Peter L. Strauss, In Search of Skidmore 7-8 (Columbia Univ. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper Series, Paper No. 13-355, 2013), available at http://papers.ssm
.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id=2287343## ("One can readily agree with the [City of Arlington v.
FCC] dissent's proposition that, 'Whether Congress has conferred such power is the "relevant questional
of law" that must be answered before affording Chevron deference,' without at all having to agree that
'the question whether an agency enjoys that authority must be decided by a court, without deference to
the agency.' Without Chevron deference, yes; without Skidmore deference, no."). The Petitioner
advanced this same argument in its Reply Brief. See Reply Brief for Petitioners City of Arlington et al.
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In City of Arlington, reasonable minds may have differed on the question
whether Congress delegated to the FCC lawmaking power to define the duration of
a "reasonable period."69 No such difference of opinion should be present regarding
the agency's self-avowed failure actually to exercise lawmaking power, even
assuming the delegation by Congress.7" Indeed, a court performing the Mead
analysis in City of Arlington would almost surely have decided that it was
unnecessary to resolve the disputed question of the scope of delegated lawmaking
power, because the second Mead condition clearly had not been met.7' The FCC
had informed the court that the agency had not intended to promulgate a
substantive rule, that is, a rule that the agency intended to define new law.72 Rather,
the agency claimed it was merely interpreting what Congress had intended
regarding a reasonable time period for local decisions.73 This is not the exercise of
lawmaking power by an agency. Even before the Court decided Mead, such an
interpretive rule was not accorded Chevron deference.
74
at 1-5, 15, City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (No. 11-1545) (arguing that the Court
should determine de novo whether there has been a delegation of lawmaking power, with the agency's
view of the scope of delegated power receiving Skidmore deference).
69 The dissent did not provide an answer to this question, concluding instead that the Court should have
remanded the question to the Fifth Circuit. See City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1886 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting). The Petitioner's requested relief was that the Court remand to the Fifth Circuit the Mead
determination whether Congress had delegated applicable law making power. See Brief for Petitioners at
44, City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (No. 11-1545).
70 But cf Strauss, supra note 68, at 6 ("That the Chevron framework would apply [in City ofArlington]
was to some extent a forgone conclusion-the FCC was acting formally, with evident juris-generative
intent.").
7' The Petitioner's discussion of the Mead analysis in its brief addressed only the first part of the Mead
analysis, whether Congress had delegated lawmaking power to the agency. See generally Brief for
Petitioners, supra note 69. The brief, however, ignored the second Mead requirement-the agency must
have exercised its lawmaking power, assuming it had been delegated. See generally id.
72 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 243 (5th Cir. 2012), affd, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
73 See id
74 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 232 ("[l]nterpretive rules ... enjoy no Chevron status as a class."); see also
Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995). The Court's statements in these cases have
resulted in a view that an agency effectively earns Chevron deference by employing procedures that
ensure an opportunity for affected parties to be engaged in the development of the agency's position.
See Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock's Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1449,
1464 (2011) (footnote omitted), who state that:
In the statutory interpretation context, agencies have a choice: they can use
notice-and-comment proceedings to promulgate their statutory interpretations
as legislative rules, in which case they will presumptively receive Chevron
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The FCC's other argument, that the declaratory ruling was an (informal)
adjudication, fares no better regarding its status as agency lawmaking. Informal
adjudication is the type of agency action least likely to involve the making of law
and thus to gain the benefit of Chevron deference.75 An informal adjudication of
the sort at issue in City of Arlington did not adjudicate the rights of any party and
surely did not indicate that the agency had made law.76 A conclusion that the
FCC's informal adjudication actually did involve the agency's intended making of
law would be a most difficult showing-a showing that would be likely to rely on
tradition77 -and neither court nor agency attempted to make such a showing. The
Mead analysis would accordingly have led to the straightforward conclusion that
the FCC would not receive Chevron deference for its interpretation of the duration
of a reasonable period for local decision-making about cell phone antennas.7"
In sum, standard analysis mandated by the Supreme Court's decision in Mead
would have established that the FCC was not owed Chevron deference. The case,
in short, was surely one that did not warrant any discussion about the scope of
deference, or they can opt to issue these interpretations informally as
interpretive rules, in which case they will have to defend their interpretations
under the less deferential Skidmore standard. But they have to select one or
the other. This "pay me now or pay me later" principle has gradually
emerged as a crucial feature of the doctrine, one that allows courts to avoid
direct regulation of agency choice of policymaking form while retaining
some form of meaningful check-either ex ante procedural safeguards or ex
post judicial scrutiny--on administrative decisions.
See also Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, Ill MICH. L. REV. 355, 398-99 (2012) ("As
reflected in the Supreme Court's decision in [Mead], statutory authority alone is not sufficient to warrant
deference under Chevron; the agency's reason-giving is a precondition to, and the object of, deference.
In other words, the agency's reasoned analysis is the coin by which it pays for (and warrants) deference
to its interpretation of the law.") (footnotes omitted).
5 See Healy, supra note 46, at 41-42 n.263.
76 In its Appellee's Brief, the FCC barely mentioned the second Mead requirement, that the agency
actually have acted in the exercise of delegated lawmaking power. It stated only that the FCC order was
"the result of an adjudication" and that the court of appeals found the agency's use of an adjudication,
rather than a rulemaking, to be harmless error. See Brief for the Federal Respondents at 34-35 n.8, City
of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (No. 11-1545). The FCC appeared quite content to
submerge the matter of the procedural formalities to a single footnote. Procedural formalities are critical,
however, to the determination of the proper standard ofjudicial review. See supra note 74.
77SeeMead, 533 U.S. at 230-31 & 231 n.13.
78 One important consequence of such a decision would be that an agency would have an incentive to
comply with informal rulemaking requirements if it wished to be accorded Chevron deference. See
supra note 74.
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Chevron deference. The only possible legal issue regarding scope of review would
have been how the Mead test would be applied to the FCC's declaratory ruling.
Only in that context would the scope of lawmaking power delegated to the FCC
have been considered, and Chevron deference would clearly not have applied in
resolving that question.
III. THE ACTIVIST DECISIONS OF THE JUSTICES
The Supreme Court's decision affirming the Fifth Circuit is most notable for
undercutting the Court's post-Mead regime for reviewing agency legal
determinations, particularly the rules for defining when a court must defer to an
agency's legal determination.7 9 The fact that none of the opinions written by the
Justices directly presented the proper framework for analysis shows either that the
Court itself does not understand how the framework should be applied or that the
Justices simply viewed the case as a vehicle to accomplish other jurisprudential
goals.8" Those goals for the principal antagonists here were to expand (Justice
Scalia) or to contract (Chief Justice Roberts) the scope of application of Chevron
deference.
A. Justice Scalia's Majority Opinion
The past decade or so has not been kind to Justice Scalia regarding his views
of the proper review standard for agency legal determinations. Justice Scalia was a
lone voice in decrying the Court's decision in United States v. Mead, which defined
the two-part test for the application of Chevron deference.8 Justice Scalia was also
alone in his dissent in Brand X five years later, in which the Court resolved
concerns about public law ossification that he had presented so fervently in his
dissent in Mead."2 Justice Scalia was unhappy about Brand X and explained his
" The Mead test is already a test that lower courts actively seek to avoid. See Bressman, supra note 39.
The fact that the Court majority in City of Arlington completely ignores the significance of Mead is
likely to discourage lower courts from applying Mead's two threshold requirements for the application
of Chevron deference. In an even more recent decision, the Court applied Chevron deference with
neither discussion of nor citation to Mead. See Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2203
(2014) (Kagan, J., plurality opinion) (according Chevron deference to interpretation of "the immigration
laws" by the Board of Immigration Appeals); id. at 2214 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (applying Chevron
deference without discussion of or citation to Mead).
" See generally City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
81 See 533 U.S. at 239-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
82 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1014-16 (2005) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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disagreement with the Court in very strong terms.83 Justice Scalia also dissented in
a high-profile case in which the Court's application of Mead yielded its refusal to
accord Chevron deference to a DOJ interpretation of the CSA.84 Justice Scalia
viewed that case as one in which Chevron deference to the agency was plainly
owed. 5
Justice Scalia must therefore have been delighted to craft a decision for the
Court majority on an issue that appeared to test the scope of application of Chevron
deference. He very likely saw the case as providing an opportunity to further two
related goals. First, he would be able to ensure broad reach of Chevron's
application by holding that the doctrine applied even when an agency was
determining the scope of its own jurisdiction. Second, he would limit the effect of
Mead by establishing that Chevron deference is owed to an agency's determination
that Congress has delegated lawmaking power to the agency.
For the Court's decision in City of Arlington to serve these related goals,
however, Justice Scalia had to be purposefully obscure and disingenuous in the
review of an agency determination that simply should not have received Chevron
deference under Mead. Justice Scalia's trope is simple, yet obscure: He changes the
shape of his discussion of Chevron from a discussion of the application of Chevron
deference to his discussion of "the Chevron framework." His unstated hope seems
to be that Mead will be forgotten and its impact undone if the Supreme Court is
seen as accepting the application of Chevron in cases and in contexts in which there
is very good reason to doubt the applicability of Chevron deference post-Mead.86
Justice Scalia's jurisprudential strategy to redefine the scope of Chevron's
applicability echoes the strategy that Justice Brennan pursued more than a quarter-
century ago as he sought to shape the law governing the permissibility of
adjudication by non-Article III adjudicators. Justice Brennan opposed the adjunct
of the court doctrine, which permitted a non-Article III tribunal to adjudicate
private rights if the tribunal was a proper adjunct to an Article III court.8 7 Justice
3 See id at 1017 ("This is not only bizarre. It is probably unconstitutional.").
s4 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 293-94 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85 See id. at 276.
86 Indeed, the Court's decision affirmed the application of Chevron in a case in which neither reviewing
court ever actually applied the Mead analysis.
87 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69-70 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
plurality opinion) (arguing that Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1931), accepted non-Article III
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Brennan sought to define a bright line rule that would determine the permissibility
of adjudication by a non-Article III tribunal, and he wished to draw that line solely
by reference to whether the matter involved the adjudication of private or public
rights."
Shaping such a legal rule was difficult because the Court had decided cases in
this area employing more flexible standards that accounted for circumstances other
than only the nature of the rights being adjudicated.89 Justice Brennan apparently
lacked the votes to overrule that standards-based approach, so he simply decided to
expand the scope of private rights cases and view all of the cases that the Court had
permitted to be adjudicated by non-Article III tribunals as public rights cases.
90
Although Justice Brennan's strategy appeared to succeed when he gathered a
majority of votes in Granfinanciera,9' its failure was clear when the Court recently
reaffirmed that prior cases had indeed held that a non-Article III tribunal may
adjudicate private rights, provided that the tribunal is properly an adjunct of the
court.92 Time will tell whether Justice Scalia's effort to undo the consequences of
Mead by defining an enlarged "Chevron framework" will also fail.
Justice Scalia's effort to make the scope of "the Chevron framework"
synonymous with the scope of Chevron deference must be rejected for three
reasons. First, Justice Scalia is being disingenuous at best in his undefended view
that cases decided at step one of Chevron-cases in which the statute is clear in
foreclosing an agency's interpretation-are in any meaningful sense Chevron
cases.93 In Justice Scalia's zeal to present a strong claim that Chevron properly
adjudication because the case involved the adjudication of congressionally-created rights rather than
private rights).
8 See CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 859 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (finding only three permissible
categories of cases for permissible non-Article III adjudication: "territorial courts, courts martial, and
courts that adjudicate certain disputes concerning public rights") (citations omitted).
'9 E.g., Schor, 478 U.S. at 853.
90 See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53-55 (1989).
9' See id.
92 See Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011) (Roberts, C.J.) (permitting proper non-Article HI
adjunct of the court to litigate private rights cases but concluding that the bankruptcy court is not a
proper adjunct).
91 Cf Kristen E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90
MNN. L. REv. 1537, 1548 (2006) ("Th[e] extension of strong judicial deference from explicit to so-
called implicit delegations represents a transfer of interpretive power from the judicial branch to
administrative agencies. This, more than the two-part test, is the heart of the Chevron doctrine.").
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applies when an agency has acted to define the scope of its own jurisdiction, he
relies on the Court's decisions in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
94
and MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co.95 To be sure, the agencies in
those cases acted to define controversially the broad scope of their regulatory
authority.96 The agencies in those cases would undoubtedly be surprised, however,
to find the Court describing them as Chevron cases. In each of these cases, the
Court held that the agency lacked the delegated authority claimed by the agency
because the Court alone decided that the statute clearly foreclosed the agency's
legal interpretation.97 Surely in neither case did the Court defer to the agency's
interpretation.98 The scope of application of Chevron deference, of course, is the
matter at issue in City ofArlington.
To describe the first step of the analysis defined by Chevron as Chevron
review is, post-Mead, at best misleading. If Mead had never been decided, there
would be neither harm nor misdirection in the claim that Chevron review is
comprised of the two steps famously identified in that case. In truth, however, the
differences between the two steps are critical in the post-Mead world of
administrative law and must be distinguished so that the scope of proper Chevron
deference can be demarcated. The first step described by Chevron involves the
court's exercise of its own interpretive authority in deciding whether a statute is
clear in defining the law.99 When a court exercises this interpretive authority, the
94 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
95 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
96 See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 125 (noting that the Food and Drug Administration (the
"FDA") reversed its position and concluded that it had authority to regulate tobacco products under the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act); MCI, 512 U.S. at 220 (stating that the FCC decided "to make tariff
filing optional for all nondominant long-distance carriers" pursuant to "its modification authority").
" See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 126; MCI, 512 U.S. at 234; cf Strauss, supra note 68, at 8
("[T]he majority in [Brown & Williamson and MCI] was able to stop its inquiry at the first step, on
finding an impermissible meaning given earlier, stable agency views that commanded respect."); but cf
Strauss, supra note 68 ("[Brown & Williamson and MCI were] two cases in which Chevron had been
applied (as indeed it was) ... ").
98 The Brown & Williamson Court required a clearer delegation of power to the FDA before the Court
would permit the FDA's exercise of regulatory authority over tobacco products. See 529 U.S. at 161.
The MCI Court concluded that the text of the statute clearly precluded the FCC's exercise of the
"modification" authority, because the agency's change was much more than a mere "modification." See
512 U.S. at 231-32.
9 See Healy, supra note 46, at 33-39 (discussing the step one analysis).
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court accords no deference to the agency's interpretation.100 The court is exercising
its own critical law-defining role in the government of separated powers.' It is
only at the second step defined by Chevron that the court must defer to the agency,
and that step is reached only after the court determines that the statute is
ambiguous.'
02
oo See Peter L. Strauss, Overseers or "The Deciders "-The Courts in Administrative Law, 75 U. CHI. L.
REv. 815, 819 (2008) [hereinafter Strauss, Overseers] ("Chevron step one is the terrain of independent
(albeit perhaps influenced) judicial judgment, cases resolved at that level have more in common with
other judicial judgments about statutory interpretation than with agency review, as such. Judges will
accept the use of legislative history or not; will be open to liberal or constrained views of the reach of
statutory language; will tend to focus on purposes or on text; and will perhaps be more generous with
the work of Republican-dominated legislatures than Democratic, or vice versa, across the broad range of
statutory interpretation issues."). Professor Strauss has argued that a court should properly accord
Skidmore deference to an agency when deciding whether a statute is clear at the first step of Chevron.
See Strauss, supra note 68, at 8 ("[Flew of those tools [of statutory construction] are more traditional
than the one that was first voiced by the Court in 1827, repeatedly invoked over the ensuing years, and
captured by Justice Jackson's formulation in Skidmore."); see also Strauss, Overseers, supra, at 818
("As part of its step one determination, a court might well turn to a responsible agency's judgment about
the matter as one weight to be considered on the scales the court is using. That is, Skidmore deference is
one of those 'traditional tools of statutory interpretation' that bear on a court's independent conclusion
about the extent of agency authority."). To be sure, when a court determines whether a statute is clear in
foreclosing an agency interpretation, the court may account for an agency's consistent view of a legal
question because that consistent agency view may properly indicate that the statute had a clear meaning.
See Michael P. Healy, Communis Opinio and the Methods of Statutory Interpretation: Interpreting Law
or Changing Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 539, 603 n.237 (2001) (discussing the value of agencies'
views in discerning legislative intent when the agency has played a significant role in drafting
legislation); id. at 583-84 (discussing how agencies' and the legal community's understanding of the
meaning of a statute is important evidence about the meaning of the statute). I disagree, though, that the
agency's view should otherwise count in a court's decision about whether a statute is clear.
... Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron's Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REv. 611, 624 (2009)
("At Chevron's first step, courts reviewing administrative constructions should begin by identifying
whether congressional instructions clearly either require or preclude the choice the agency has made or,
instead, whether the agency's choice falls within a range of possibilities permitted by language that
Congress has left ambiguous. If the former, statutory meaning is set; consistent agency interpretations
should be upheld on the court's own authority, while contrary constructions must be rejected. If the
latter, agency interpretations that do not fall within the zone of indeterminacy permitted by the statute's
language must be struck down. This constitutes the scope of the independent judicial task."); see also
Strauss, Overseers, supra note 100, at 818 ("Defining the areas of ambiguity within which, Chevron
says, agencies have presumptively the leading oar is a part of the independent judicial task of step
one.").
102 See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1253, 1260-61 (1997) ("Under the structure of the Chevron formula, a court should not reach step two
unless it has already found during step one that the statute supports the government's interpretation or at
least is ambiguous with respect to it. In other words, the agency's view is not clearly contrary to the
meaning of the statute. If the court has made such a finding, one would think that the govemment's
interpretation must be at least 'reasonable' in the court's eyes.").
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By misleadingly claiming an overly broad scope of Chevron review-"the
Chevron framework"-Justice Scalia is able to describe cases as Chevron cases,
despite the fact that there was no deference to an agency because a clear statute as
determined by the court resolved the interpretive question.103 The proposition that
the application of the Chevron standard is so broad as to include cases decided at
both the first and second steps described in Chevron has an important consequence
for the Mead analysis. The Mead analysis, of course, determines whether Chevron
deference applies. Justice Scalia's broad view of Chevron's application would
mean that the Mead analysis would have to be conducted before the court has itself
decided whether the statute is clear or ambiguous. This approach would efine the
Mead analysis as a step zero inquiry, 10 4 rather than a step one and one-half
inquiry.0 5 The step zero view of the timing of the Mead analysis is flawed for two
reasons. First, if the statute is clear, the legal matter is resolved and there is no
reason to employ Mead to determine whether Congress intended that the court
defer to the agency's legal interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Defining the
Mead analysis as a step zero inquiry would result in unnecessary analysis in any
case in which the court concludes (at step one) that the statute clearly bars the
agency interpretation. Second, if the Mead analysis were conducted prior to the
step one analysis, if it were a step zero inquiry, one would have to decide what the
step one analysis would be under Mead. Presumably, such an analysis would be
identical to the longstanding Chevron step one analysis: a determination of whether
the statute is clear without any deference to the agency. Moreover, the Court's
decision in Brand X means that it is now important that a court decide whether a
statute's meaning is clear (a step one determination) or ambiguous with the court
determining the statute's meaning by employing Skidmore review.0 6 If the statute
is ambiguous, BrandXpermits the agency to change its interpretation by exercising
103 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161; MCI, 512 U.S. at 231-32.
"0 The Petitioner had equated the Mead analysis with a Chevron step zero analysis. See supra note 61.
05 For a discussion about the Court's inconsistency in defining when a court should undertake the Mead
analysis, see Healy, supra note 46, at 25-27. That article strongly advocated that the Mead analysis
should be conducted after step one of Chevron is completed. See id. at 39-42.
"o See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-83 (2005) ("A
court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to
Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.... Only a judicial
precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency's interpretation, and therefore
contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction."); id. at 985 ("Before
a judicial construction of a statute, whether contained in a precedent or not, may trump an agency's, the
court must hold that the statute unambiguously requires the court's construction.").
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its lawmaking power, and the new interpretation will receive Chevron deference
(assuming that Congress has delegated lawmaking power to the agency).07
Because the first step under either regime would be identical, it would be
unnecessary judicial analysis to perform the potentially difficult Mead analysis in a
case in which the statute would be found clear in either event. In short, the Court
erred in its failure both to conduct a Mead analysis before addressing the scope of
properly applicable Chevron deference and to characterize its initial analysis of
whether the statute is clear as Chevron analysis.
Justice Scalia's desire to claim the broadest application of Chevron by
discussing the breadth of "the Chevron framework" rather than Chevron deference
also fails because it simply proves too much.' The Court in City of Arlington
accorded Chevron deference to the agency even though it issued a regulation that
the agency did not intend to be an exercise of lawmaking power and which did not
conform to the APA's procedural requirements for notice and comment
rulemaking. 9 This agency ruling would very likely not have received Chevron
deference even before Mead was decided on grounds that the agency had not
earned judicial deference because it had relied on the APA exception to rulemaking
procedures."10 The ruling surely should not receive Chevron deference after Mead.
The danger that City of Arlington poses is that Justice Scalia relied on the
assumption or the acceptance that the case was within "the Chevron framework" to
enable the conclusion that an agency receives Chevron deference if a statute is not
clear about the delegation of lawmaking power. Mead held,"' and Gonzales v.
Oregon confirmed, 12 that that decision was one to be made by a court without any
deference to an agency. This inquiry about whether Congress delegated lawmaking
power to the agency is the first question asked by Mead, prior to any application of
deference."3 Indeed, City of Arlington undercuts Gonzales, a decision sharply
criticized by Justice Scalia."' The Gonzales Court employed the first part of the
107 See id. at 983.
0 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1870 (2013).
o9 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
Io See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
"' See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258-69 (2006).
..3 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
114 See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 275-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Mead analysis-questioning whether Congress delegated lawmaking power to the
agency-to foreclose Chevron deference to the agency by narrowly construing,
contrary to the agency's interpretation, the scope of lawmaking power that
Congress had delegated to the DOJ. 15 The result in City of Arlington, therefore,
necessarily weakens Mead, no doubt to the delight of Justice Scalia.l"
6
Justice Scalia's delight at undermining Mead can be inferred from his
loathing of that decision."7 His loathing seems to have two important sources.
First, Mead's limitation on the scope of Chevron deference is a consequence of the
Court's inference about the degree of deference intended by Congress for an
agency's legal interpretations."' Justice Scalia has been outspoken in his rejection
of legislative intent as a basis for the interpretation of statutes.'9 Although he is
quite comfortable employing interpretive rules or canons that prescribe the
presumptive meaning of statutes,12 he rejects reliance on intent of the legislature
when interpreting a statute.'2 1 Mead is heavily dependent on inferring
congressional intent about the circumstances under which deference is owed to an
agency. 1
22
The second, and possibly more important, reason Justice Scalia so strongly
objected to Mead was that the decision revived the application of Skidmore
.. See id. at 258-69. The Court employed the elephants-in-mouseholes canon to support its narrow
interpretation of the delegation of law making power to the DOJ. See id.
116 Cf Strauss, supra note 68, at 6 ("[B]y [sleight] of hand, perhaps, [Justice Scalia] appears to have
accomplished in City ofArlington the proposition for which he alone argued in Mead.").
' See Mead, 533 U.S. at 261 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Mead is] one of the most significant opinions
ever rendered by the Court dealing with the judicial review of administrative action. Its consequences
will be enormous, and almost uniformly bad."); see also id. at 239 ("Today's opinion makes an avulsive
change in judicial review of federal administrative action.").
118 See id at 226-27 & 229.
"9 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 17 (1998) ("It is the law that governs, not the
intent of the lawgiver. That seems to me the essence of the famous American ideal set forth in the
Massachusetts constitution: A government of laws, not men. Men may intend what they will; but it is
only the laws that they enact which bind us.").
120 E.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468-69 (2001).
121 See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Our job begins with a text
that Congress has passed and the President has signed. We are to read the words of that text as any
ordinary Member of Congress would have read them, and apply the meaning so determined.") (citation
omitted).
122 See generally Michael P. Healy, Spurious Interpretation Redux: Mead and the Shrinking Domain of
Statutory Ambiguity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 673 (2002).
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review,123 a regime Justice Scalia believed had been entirely superseded by
Chevron.124 Justice Scalia scorns Skidmore review because he believes it elevates a
standard over a rule and, as a result, places too much interpretive power in
courts.125 To be sure, Skidmore review is dependent (as all review standards are) on
the good faith of the reviewing court. Skidmore review permits courts to account
for the agency's experience and expertise when the court must itself determine the
proper meaning of an ambiguous statute and Chevron deference does not apply.'26
Justice Scalia's claim to abjure broad judicial decision-making authority by
advocating the broad scope of "the Chevron framework" should be taken, however,
with a very large grain of salt. Justice Scalia has a well-known and often-practiced
ability to reject agency interpretations that expand the agencies' regulatory
.23 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 ("To agree with the Court of Appeals that Customs ruling letters do not
fall within Chevron is not, however, to place them outside the pale of any deference whatever. Chevron
did nothing to eliminate Skidmore's holding that an agency's interpretation may merit some deference
whatever its form, given the 'specialized experience and broader investigations and information'
available to the agency, and given the value of uniformity in its administrative and judicial
understandings of what a national law requires[.]" (citation omitted) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944))).
124 See id. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing Skidmore as an "anachronism"); id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tihe rule of Skidmore deference is an empty truism and a trifling statement of the
obvious[.]"); see also id. at 252 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The principles central to today's opinion have
no antecedent in our jurisprudence."); Strauss, supra note 68, at 5 ("Chevron, [Justice Scalia] argued,
had consigned Skidmore to the waste-bin of history.").
125 Justice Scalia expressed his view in Mead that Skidmore review is nothing more than "that test most
beloved by a court unwilling to be held to rules (and most feared by litigants who want to know what to
expect): th' ol' 'totality of the circumstances' test." Mead, 533 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26 It is worth noting that Justice Scalia's rejection of Skidmore review fails to engage with the core of its
significance, which is that the court itself has the authority to construe the legal source being interpreted
and ought to consider relevant information in reaching its judgment. See John F. Manning,
Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 612, 681 (1996) ("[A]n agency's interpretation, ... if not binding upon a reviewing court,
retains value as a tool of construction. Congress's decision to commit lawmaking power to agencies
vests substantial regulatory authority in specialized bodies with knowledge, expertise, and experience
that generalist courts lack. Agencies may therefore have insights into regulatory history, context, or
purpose that may not be readily apparent to even the most seasoned federal judge."); see also Peter L.
Strauss, "Deference" Is Too Confusing-Let's Call Them "Chevron Space" and "Skidmore Weight,"
112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1156 (2012) ("What is 'exclusively a judicial function' does not exclude
agency views. Once a question of statutory interpretation has been put before a court, it is for the court
to resolve the question of meaning. Among the matters indispensable for it to consider, however, are the
meanings attributed to it by prior (administrative) interpreters, their stability, and the possibly superior
body of information and more embracive responsibilities that underlay them. They may be entitled to
great 'weight' on the judicial scales."). Perhaps Justice Scalia simply knows courts too well to support a
rule that depends on judicial good faith.
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authority.127 He exercises this judicial power, however, at step one of Chevron by
concluding either that the statute is clear128 or that ambiguity, because of the
application of a required clear statement rule, is an insufficient legislative grant of
power when the agency is making a decision that has great regulatory effect.
129
Indeed, there is a rich irony that Justice Scalia, who developed and then christened
the modem administrative law elephants-in-mouseholes canon,130 chided Chief
Justice Roberts in City ofArlington for supporting a rule that Justice Scalia claimed
defined a distinction between big and small questions when deciding whether
deference applies.'3 ' In this regard, it is worth recognizing the different results of
judicially active decisions that restrain the regulatory authority of agencies. When,
following proper application of the Mead analysis, a court reviews an agency's
interpretation under the Skidmore regime and the court interpreting the ambiguous
statute reaches a different interpretation than the agency's interpretive conclusion,
the agency may, if it has delegated lawmaking power, change the law to its original
view, which would be accorded Chevron deference if the agency did later exercise
its lawmaking power.'32 When, however, a court employs the elephants-in-
mouseholes canon and rejects the agency's interpretation under step one of
Chevron, an amendment of the statute by Congress is necessary before the
agency's interpretation would be permitted (even though the statute is otherwise
ambiguous on its face regarding the legal issue).
Worth considering, finally, is how City of Arlington may affect the future
application of Mead. To be sure, City of Arlington may have the perverse and sub
silentio effect of substantially weakening the Mead test by requiring deference to
2 E.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732 (2006) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (relying on the
determinate meaning of "the waters" in the Clean Water Act); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531
U.S. 457, 468-69 (2001) (relying on the text of the Clean Air Act and the clear statement rule to
conclude that an agency lacked certain regulatory authority).
28 E.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 107 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 226-29 (1994).
129 E.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468-69.
1
30 
Id.
131 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013).
32 This proposition, as is stated, is based on the assumption that Congress has delegated lawmaking
power to the agency. Part III.C of this article contends that Chief Justice Roberts is suggesting that
courts ought to employ a clear statement rule that requires Congress to delegate lawmaking power
expressly before a court should conclude that the agency possesses such power. This interpretive rule
would have an effect analogous to the elephants-in-mouseholes canon. See infra notes 157-58 and
accompanying text.
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an agency's conclusion that Congress delegated lawmaking power to the agency.
Mead would still, however, require a judicial determination about whether the
agency had actually exercised the lawmaking power Congress had delegated to it.
If there is no such agency exercise (as there had not been in City of Arlington),
there is no Chevron deference, even if a court were to defer to an agency's view
that the agency had been delegated (unexercised) lawmaking power.
B. Justice Breyer's Concurring Opinion
Justice Breyer concurs in part and concurs in the Court's judgment.133 His
opinion is much more consistent with t e Court's post-Mead regime for review of
agency legal interpretations. Nevertheless, his opinion is not nearly as clear as it
could be in explaining how City ofArlington ought to fit within that regime. Justice
Breyer initially presented Mead as something less than a test that must be applied
once a court has determined that a statute is ambiguous. Mead is described as an
"example" of how the Court "looked to several factors other than simple ambiguity
to help determine whether Congress left a statutory gap, thus delegating to the
agency the authority to fill that gap with an interpretation that would carry 'the
force of law."" 34 That Justice Breyer has failed to present Mead as having defined
a clear rule that determines the scope of application of Chevron deference is
somewhat unsurprising given that Justice Breyer wrote the Court's opinion in
Barnhart v. Walton.35 That post-Mead decision is likely the most standard-like and
least rule-like decision determining whether Chevron deference or Skidmore review
applies.' 
36
Despite this lack of full clarity, Justice Breyer's opinion does provide
important insights into the Mead analysis, even though those insights have to be
teased out. First, Justice Breyer rejected the view implicitly presented by Justice
133 City ofArlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1875 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
'"' Id. (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001)).
135 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
136 See id. at 222 (applicable regime is determined based on "the interstitial nature of the legal question,
the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute, the
complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over
a long period of time"); see also Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 1004 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Congress may have intended not to leave the matter of a particular
interpretation up to the agency, irrespective of the procedure the agency uses to arrive at that
interpretation, say, where an unusually basic legal question is at issue.") (citation omitted). Justice Scalia
has criticized Justice Breyer's flexibility in determining whether Chevron deference is to be accorded to
an agency's interpretation. See id. at 1015 n.9 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Scalia, that the Mead analysis is a step-zero analysis. He instead correctly stated
that courts are to pursue the Mead analysis of whether Chevron deference is
appropriate only after "consider[ing] 'traditional tools of statutory construction'
and concluding that the statute is ambiguous.' 37 The Mead analysis then determines
whether Chevron deference or Skidmore review applies to the agency's
interpretation of the statute, which the court has determined to be ambiguous.
Without specifically stating that he was pursuing the Mead analysis, Justice
Breyer decided near the end of his opinion, without according any deference to the
agency, that Congress had "l[eft] a gap for the FCC to fill."' 38 This conclusion
about the scope of the lawmaking power delegated to the agency reflects Justice
Breyer's view that nothing in the statute "'expressly describ[es] an exception' to
the FCC's plenary authority to interpret the act."'39 Under this approach, a broad
delegation presumptively gives the agency lawmaking power in particular
applications, unless Congress has defined specific exceptions to the agency's
delegated power.
40
Justice Breyer's attention to the first part of the Mead analysis contrasts with
his conclusory one-sentence treatment of the second Mead inquiry: "I would hold
that the FCC's lawful effort to do so[,] [that is, to fill the statutory gap,] carr[ies]
'the force of law."' 141 Justice Breyer provided no analysis to support this
conclusion. This article contends that this conclusion about the second part of the
Mead inquiry is incorrect and that a proper consideration of the FCC's declaratory
ruling would demonstrate that the agency did not intend to make law and did not
exercise its delegated lawmaking powers, even assuming such powers had been
delegated to the FCC.
142
' City ofArlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1876 (quoting INS. v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987)).
138 Id. at 1877.
139 Id. (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 613 (1991)).
140 This is a presumptive meaning of the statute, similar to the meaning suggested by Justice Scalia. See
supra note 67 and accompanying text.
4 ' City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1877 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229
(2001)).
142 See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
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C. Chief Justice Roberts's Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the dissent in City of Arlington.14 3 Justices
Kennedy and Alito joined the dissent.'4 The Chief Justice began by stating a
proposition that is at the core of Mead's limitation of the scope of Chevron
deference. Indeed, the dissent repeated the proposition defined by Mead, that the
proper review standard depends on a determination to be made by the court alone
about the scope of authority delegated to an agency by Congress:
Courts defer to an agency's interpretation of law when and because Congress
has conferred on the agency interpretive authority over the question at issue. An
agency cannot exercise interpretive authority until it has it; the question whether
an agency enjoys that authority must be decided by a court, without deference to
the agency. 45
Although the dissent asserted that this principle is "easily expressed,"'46 it would
have been more clearly and helpfully expressed if it had simply cited Mead for this
core principle and had substituted lawmaking authority for "interpretive authority."
The dissent then proceeded to describe the great power exercised by agencies
in the modem American state,47 power that the dissent later stated must be closely
scrutinized by the federal judiciary to ensure the proper separation of powers.
148
The dissent presented "against this background" of powerful administrative
agencies the question posed by the case: "whether the authority of administrative
agencies should be augmented even further, to include not only broad power to
143 City ofArlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1877 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
144Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 The Chief Justice stated that "[tihe administrative state 'wields vast power and touches almost every
aspect of daily life,"' id. at 1878 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561
U.S. 477, 499 (2010), although he did also accept that "[i]t would be a bit much to describe the result as
the very definition of tyranny."). Id. at 1879 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
141 See id. at 1886 ("An agency's interpretive authority, entitling the agency to judicial deference,
acquires its legitimacy from a delegation of law making power from Congress to the Executive. Our
duty to police the boundary between the Legislature and the Executive is as critical as our duty to
respect that between the Judiciary and the Executive.") (citation omitted).
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give definitive answers to questions left to them by Congress, but also the same
power to decide when Congress has given them that power."'
149
The dissent claimed that "it is necessary to sort through some confusion over
what this litigation is about. The source of the confusion is a familiar culprit: the
concept of 'jurisdiction.""' 151 In the dissent's view, the jurisdictional question
presented by the case was whether "a court should not defer to an agency on
whether Congress has granted the agency interpretive authority over the statutory
ambiguity at issue."'151 Unfortunately, the dissent did not establish in clear and
direct terms that this is the very question considered as the first half of the Mead
analysis (provided that the dissent understood "interpretive authority" as the power
to define law on the question). If the dissent had framed the question as one that is
at the center of the Mead analysis, the dissent could have demonstrated more
clearly that the majority's approach at the very least ignores the application of
Mead. The dissent, in other words, confused matters because it failed to clarify that
the majority erred when it applied Chevron deference without determining first that
each of the two requirements for such deference had been met.
The dissent's brief Part II discussion restated the core principle of Mead that
Congress determines whether a court is to defer to an agency's interpretation of an
ambiguous statute.' The dissent then relied on the separation of powers to
reinforce that principle by declaring that "before a court may grant such deference,
it must on its own decide whether Congress-the branch vested with law making
authority under the Constitution-has in fact delegated to the agency [lawmaking]
power over the ambiguity at issue."' The dissent suggested, moreover, that the
' Id. at 1879. One may wonder why the dissent did not state at this point that Mead had already
definitively resolved this question.
[
50 
Id.
151 Id. at 1879-80.
11 See id at 1880.
' Id. (citation omitted). Part Ill of the dissent discussed how the limitation on the scope of deference
followed from the Court's decisions in several cases, including Chevron and Mead. See id. at 1881. The
dissent's conclusion at the end of Part Ill echoed its conclusion at the end of Part 11: "[W]e do not defer
to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous provision unless Congress wants us to, and whether
Congress wants us to is a question that courts, not agencies, must decide. Simply put, that question is
'beyond the Chevron pale."' Id. at 1883 (quoting United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001)); see
also City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1886 ("Chevron importantly guards against the Judiciary arrogating
to itself policymaking properly left, under the separation of powers, to the Executive. But there is
another concern at play, no less firmly rooted in our constitutional structure. That is the obligation of the
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judiciary's independent role had become increasingly important as agencies have
come to play a critically important role in modem public law.'54
Only Part IV of the dissent included analysis that suggested how a judicial
review regime motivated by heightened concern about the great authority now
exercised by administrative agencies might properly constrain the exercise of such
authority.' Such a limitation could arise from presumptions regarding the
congressional delegation of lawmaking power to an agency:
If a congressional delegation of interpretive authority is to support Chevron
deference, however, that delegation must extend to the specific statutory
ambiguity at issue. The appropriate question is whether the delegation covers the
"specific provision" and "particular question" before the court. Chevron, 467
U.S. at 844. A congressional grant of authority over some portion of a statute
does not necessarily mean that Congress granted the agency interpretive
authority over all its provisions.1
56
Chief Justice Roberts was focused only on the role that courts must play to
ensure that agencies act only in contexts and ways that Congress has given them
power to act. His focus was accordingly on the role of courts in defining the limits
Judiciary not only to confine itself to its proper role, but to ensure that the other branches do so as
well.").
"I4 See id at 1886 ("An agency's interpretive authority, entitling the agency to judicial deference,
acquires its legitimacy from a delegation of law making power from Congress to the Executive. Our
duty to police the boundary between the Legislature and the Executive is as critical as our duty to
respect that between the Judiciary and the Executive. In the present context, that means ensuring that the
Legislative Branch has in fact delegated lawmaking power to an agency within the Executive Branch,
before the Judiciary defers to the Executive on what the law is. That concem is heightened, not
diminished, by the fact that the administrative agencies, as a practical matter, draw upon a potent brew
of executive, legislative, and judicial power. And it is heightened, not diminished, by the dramatic shift
in power over the last [fifty] years from Congress to the Executive-a shift effected through the
administrative agencies.") (citations omitted).
I55 ld. at 1883.
156 Id. (second citation omitted). The Chief Justice did not opine that a proper non-deferential
construction of the statute would be that Congress had not delegated to the FCC the power to define law
prescribing a "reasonable time" for final local action on antenna applications. The dissent would simply
have remanded for reconsideration without according deference to the FCC regarding the scope of the
agency's lawmaking power. See id. at 1886 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("Because the court should have
determined on its own whether Congress delegated interpretive authority over § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) to the
FCC before affording Chevron deference, I would vacate the decision below and remand the cases to the
Fifth Circuit to perform the proper inquiry in the first instance.").
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on agency power based on the direction of Congress. He suggested strongly in this
regard that courts should be wary when deciding whether Congress has delegated
lawmaking power to an agency and "determine whether the delegation covers the
specific provision and particular question before the court."'
l57
Chief Justice Roberts's reasoning could, in a subsequent iteration, be
reconfigured to yield a clear-statement rule regarding congressional delegation of
substantial, as distinguished from routine, lawmaking power. Such an approach
would mean that a court would be less likely, in resolving the first part of the Mead
analysis, to conclude independently that Congress had delegated lawmaking power
to the agency. The inadequacy of ambiguity in this context of the scope of
delegated power would be closely analogous to the elephants-in-mouseholes canon
advocated by Justice Scalia in determining whether an otherwise ambiguous statute
nevertheless has a clear meaning because a clear-statement rule applies.'58 In
Gonzales, the Court did rely in part on this clear statement canon when the Court
declined to accord Chevron deference to an Interpretive Regulation issued by the
DOJ to interpret the CSA.159 Notwithstanding a facially ambiguous statute, such an
inferred limit on the agency's scope of authority would necessitate amendment of
the statute before the agency could exercise the power that the Court has concluded
Congress may delegate to an agency only when it has enacted a statute that clearly
gives the agency such authority.
Mead does not itself resolve the extent to which courts may or should employ
presumptions to discern the nature of lawmaking power delegated by Congress to
an agency. Presumably, a court is to apply the traditional tools of statutory
construction when it decides whether Congress has delegated lawmaking power to
the agency.160 The clarity and development of administrative law would have been
157 Id. at 1883. The Petitioner had advocated the use of a clear-statement rule when a court interprets the
scope of lawmaking power that Congress has delegated to an agency. See Petitioner's Brief on the
Merits at 13, City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (No. 11-1547) ("Chevron step 0 requires
some affirmative indication on the part of Congress of its intention to delegate interpretive jurisdiction
to the agency.") (footnote omitted); cf id. at 19 ("This determination [of the delegation of lawmaking
power] is done de nova, and ambiguity falls to the benefit of the courts rather than the agency.").
... This canon is discussed supra at notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
'5 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255 (2006).
6o When a court undertakes the Mead analysis to determine whether Chevron deference applies, it
exercises its own interpretive power. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. The court exercises the
same type of interpretive authority when it decides (without deference) whether the statute clearly
forecloses an agency's interpretation at the first step of its analysis. See Healy, supra note 46, at 33-39.
When exercising its own interpretive authority to make either of these decisions, a court should have the
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better served if the majority had been engaged directly in this debate. The opinions
written in City ofArlington fail, however, to define in clear and direct terms the key
issue that the Justices seemed to want to address in the case: the application of the
first part of the Mead test and whether any presumptions do or should apply when
answering Mead's question about he delegation of lawmaking power.16 1 Mead's
limit on the application of Chevron deference is based on the inferred intent of
Congress. The limits on agency authority suggested by Chief Justice Roberts would
be added to the limits already established by Mead.
Based upon Justice Scalia's longstanding loathing for the Court's decision in
Mead, he is likely happy simply to ignore Mead's applicability to further his own
ends. Why would Chief Justice Roberts, however, ignore the significance of Mead
to the question whether an agency is to be accorded Chevron deference by a court?
Although Mead and Gonzales may not have established precisely the limits that
Chief Justice Roberts appeared to be advocating in City ofArlington, Mead still has
already defined two important threshold requirements for the application of
Chevron deference. The Chief Justice should have focused on the application of
those accepted limits rather than on seeking to define new limits. If the Chief
Justice had attended to Mead, he may have seen that the Mead approach properly
accounts for the role of courts, Congress, and agencies in modem public law.
CONCLUSION: THE MEANING AND EFFECT OF CITY OF
ARLINGTON
A critically important value animating Mead is that the application of judicial
deference to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute is dependent on the
actions of each of the two non-judicial actors in modem public law: Congress and
the administrative agency responsible for executing the law. Mead holds that before
an agency is accorded judicial deference, Congress must have delegated relevant
lawmaking power to that agency.162 This is the first of two actions. In the event
Congress has delegated such lawmaking power, the agency must actually have
exercised that delegated power when interpreting the statute. Exercising delegated
lawmaking power will typically involve notice and comment rulemaking or formal
authority to consider traditional aids to statutory construction. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 n.9 (1984).
161 This article argued earlier that the case could have been resolved most easily if the reviewing courts
had considered the second requirement of the Mead test, whether the agency did actually act in the
exercise of the lawmaking power delegated to the agency. See supra Part It.
162 United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226 (2001).
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adjudication procedures.163 In both of these administrative contexts, the required
procedures-by involving parties interested in the exercise of the lawmaking power
contemplated by the agency-help ensure a fully and fairly considered exercise of
agency lawmaking power. This agency action is the second of the two non-judicial
actions, and Mead requires both before the court will accord Chevron deference to
the agency's interpretation.
None of the decisions in City ofArlington properly accounts for this value and
understanding of Mead. Justice Scalia chose to ignore altogether the Mead
limitation on judicial deference. Justice Breyer understood the Mead limitation but
concluded that deference to the FCC was appropriate only by providing an ipse
dixit conclusion about the FCC's exercise of the lawmaking power that he
concluded Congress had delegated to the FCC.1"
Chief Justice Roberts hoped to limit the power of agencies by constraining the
scope of application of Chevron deference. He suggested that when a court
considers the first of the Mead questions, a broad, general grant of lawmaking
power may not be sufficient to authorize agency lawmaking in specific contexts.
165
If courts were to take that approach, Skidmore review rather than Chevron
deference would apply in a broader range of cases. This approach would also make
the second of the Mead inquiries-whether the agency actually exercised the
delegated lawmaking power-less important. This approach would accordingly be
less attentive to the action of the agency in determining whether Chevron deference
should apply. The focus would be more firmly fixed on the statute enacted by
Congress and the rules of interpretation, including the rules of clear statement,
fashioned by the judiciary, in many cases after the time of enactment.
That the Chief Justice sought to articulate in City ofArlington a new limit on
the scope of Chevron deference is ironic for two reasons. First, Congress had
delegated broad lawmaking power-"plenary authority" in the words of Justice
Breyer16 6-to the FCC regarding regulation of telecommunications, and Congress
had not defined an "express[] ... exception" to that authority.'67 Second, a
1
6 3 Id. at 229.
164 See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
165 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2013).
166 See id. at 1877 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
167 Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). Indeed, the Court in Gonzales had contrasted the
circumscribed law making power delegated to the Attorney General in that case with the broad
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restrained court would resist opining about the extent of lawmaking power that
Congress had delegated to an agency when the agency had not purported to
exercise any lawmaking power. In such a case, there is surely no need for a
properly restrained judiciary to determine whether lawmaking authority had been
delegated.
The Court's decision has the potential to undercut significantly the impact of
Mead because it is unlikely that many statutes will clearly limit the delegation of
lawmaking power to an agency. The decision may accordingly be read as
establishing that a court must defer to an agency's decision that it has received
delegated authority when the statute is ambiguous. Such an approach may be
defensible if defined as a presumption of legislative intent.6 ' The approach,
however, directly conflicts with Mead, if it is understood as a context for deference
to the agency. The decision also undercuts Mead because application of the
accepted, proper Mead analysis would have foreclosed the application of Chevron
deference. Practitioners of administrative law can only be confused by the
application of Chevron deference, given the administrative action reviewed in City
of Arlington and the fact that neither reviewing court actually bothered to apply the
Mead test before proceeding to accord Chevron deference.169 Because none of the
decisions properly framed the Mead analysis, perhaps the likeliest effect of the
Court's decision is that it will simply yield greater confusion about the proper
standards for judicial review of agencies' legal determinations.
That the majority decision is joined by Justices who have accepted the
significance of Mead and its limitations on the application of Chevron deference
surely means that the significance of Justice Scalia's decision is uncertain. That
City of Arlington has overruled Mead sub silentio would be remarkable. More
likely, the decision means only that when properly applicable (following the Mead
analysis), Chevron deference extends to agency interpretations that define the
extent of the agency's jurisdiction.70 This understanding of the decision would be
lawmaking power that Congress had delegated to the FCC regarding telecommunications. See Gonzales,
546 U.S. at 258-59.
16' This is close to the approach to the first Mead question taken by Justice Breyer. See City ofArlington,
133 S. Ct. at 1877 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
69 This may encourage lower courts to apply Chevron deference without any prior application of the
Mead test. Lower courts do not need such encouragement. See supra note 39.
70 This seems to be the position taken by Justice Breyer at the beginning of his concurring opinion. See
City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1875. The FCC also made this argument. See Brief for the Federal
Respondents, at 30-32, City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (Nos. 11-1545, 11-1547)
(presenting the unexceptional argument that Chevron deference may properly apply to an agency's
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entirely noncontroversial. Because the meaning of the decision is unclear, perhaps
its impact will be limited.171 That lack of clarity is a consequence of the Court's
activist agenda and failure to exercise restraint in the application of its own
precedent.
interpretation of a statutory provision that effectively defines the scope of the agency's jurisdiction); see
also id. at 22-25 (arguing that defining a limit on Chevron deference based on whether the provision
limited the agency's jurisdiction would be unworkable).
7 ' See Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2015).
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